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ABSTRACT: 
 
The plain momentum strategy has been a profitable investment strategy for investors in many 
countries. Despite the success of the momentum strategies, the plain momentum is prone to 
momentum crashes. The momentum crashes can wipe out the returns of the decades, and it 
might take years that the plain momentum recovers from the crash. To improve momentum 
profitability and avoid the momentum crashes, Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) present a risk-
managed momentum strategy. This thesis examines whether the risk-managed momentum pro-
duces positive abnormal returns in European and global (North America, Japan and Asia-Pacific) 
equity markets. Furthermore, this thesis takes a deeper look at how managing the risk of the 
momentum reduces the momentum crash risk and increases the profitability measured by the 
Sharpe ratio. 
 
This thesis utilizes only the data from the largest stocks, which comprise 90 % of the total market 
capitalization. All the data are downloaded from Kenneth French’s website, and the time period 
that is used is from January 1995 to December 2019. To construct the risk-managed momentum 
portfolios, this thesis uses the same procedure as Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015). In order to 
test the positive abnormal returns of the risk-managed momentum, the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regressions that utilize the Fama-French three-factor model (FF3) and Fama-French five-
factor model (FF5) are run. Moreover, robustness tests are formed by dividing the whole sample 
period into four different subsamples.  
 
The results of the whole sample period indicate that the risk-managed momentum strategy pro-
duces statistically significant positive abnormal returns in Europe and Asia-Pacific but not in 
North America and Japan. Even though managing the risk of the momentum does not produce 
statistically significant positive abnormal returns in all research regions, it provides other bene-
fits for the investors. The risk-managed momentum produces higher Sharpe ratio compared to 
the plain momentum. The Sharpe ratio results are robust in every subsample and every research 
region. Usually, high kurtosis values are related to plain momentum strategy, but this thesis 
provides results that the risk-managed momentum drops the kurtosis values near to normal 
distribution. Furthermore, managing the risk of the momentum improves whole sample skew-
ness values in every research area and even provides positive skewness values. Thus, this indi-
cates that the risk-managed momentum virtually eliminates the momentum crashes.  
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During history, investors have developed different strategies to beat the market. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) present the momentum strategy, and their findings 
aroused the interest of researchers all around the world.  They find that previous winners 
tend to rise in the future, and the previous losers tend to decrease in the future. Their 
finding raises questions towards Fama’s (1970) efficient market hypothesis, which sug-
gests that all past information is already in the stock prices. Therefore, it is not possible 
to earn positive abnormal returns by creating a strategy based on past returns. 
 
The earliest momentum studies were in the U.S. market, but the Rouwenhorst (1998) 
presents the first momentum study outside of U.S. Later many momentum studies are 
presented in globally (Chan, Hameed and Tong 2000; Griffin, Ji and Martin 2003; Fama 
and French 2015). The wide popularity of the momentum strategy in equity market in-
spire researchers to study momentum strategy in different asset classes. Researchers 
show that the momentum works in commodities, stock indices, currencies, across asset 
classes, industry portfolios and many other asset classes (Asness, Liew, and Stevens 1997; 
Bianchi, Drew and Fan 2016; Menkhof, Sarno, Schmeling and Schrimpf 2012; Moskowitz 
and Grinblatt 1999; Okunev and White 2003). Momentum strategy works by alone and 
combined with other strategies. For example, researchers combine momentum and 
value investing (Bird and Whitaker 2004). Furthermore, there are widely known opposite 
strategy for the momentum, contrarian strategy, where investors buy past losers and sell 
past winners (Ryan and Overmyer 2004). 
 
Despite the success of the momentum strategy in various countries and asset classes, 
the crash risk is related closely to the momentum strategy. The negatively skewed return 
distribution makes momentum strategy more vulnerable to the crashes than most of the 
other strategies. The momentum strategy suffered -91,59 % losses in 1932, and -73,42 % 
loses in 2009 (Barroso and Santa Clara 2015). The momentum crashes appear when col-
lapsed market starts to increase rapidly and cause a high rise of loser stocks returns 
(Daniel and Moskowitz 2016). To reduce the negative skewness and the probability of 
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the momentum crash, Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) present a risk-managed momen-
tum strategy. They estimate the momentum risk by the realized variance of daily returns 
and find that managing the risk reduces negative skewness, eliminates crashes and al-
most doubles a Sharpe ratio. The findings raise questions, does the risk-managed mo-
mentum work in different countries, asset classes and time periods? 
 
 
1.1 The purpose of the study and contribution 
This thesis aims to test with three-factor (FF3) and five-factor (FF5) models, does the 
Barroso and Santa-Clara’s (2015) risk-managed momentum strategy produce positive ab-
normal returns in European and global equity markets. These two main research ques-
tions will be answered in the results section. The investigation of the risk-managed mo-
mentum abnormal returns is not the only purpose of this thesis. The thesis takes a 
deeper look at momentum and risk-managed momentum in Europe and examines how 
managing the risk of the momentum reduces the momentum crash risk and increases 
the profitability measured by the Sharpe ratio. Globally, the thesis also examines the 
same things that in the European market but focuses more on the investigation, whether 
risk-managed momentum produces positive abnormal returns globally. 
 
The clear contribution to the previous literature is made in this thesis. Barroso and Santa-
Clara's (2015) paper is one of the few studies which focuses on managing the risk of the 
equity plain momentum while most of the studies focus on managing the risk of the 
industrial momentum. The first contribution is made in research area selection. This the-
sis examines the risk-managed momentum globally more widely (European, North Amer-
ica, Japan and Asia-Pacific) than the previous literature. Especially this thesis provides 
new information about risk-managed momentum in Asia-Pacific due to the lack of pre-
vious studies. On other words, wider evidence will be presented whether or not the risk-
managed momentum works. The second contribution is made in the time period selec-
tion, where this thesis uses the most recent data from the past 25 years. Therefore, this 
thesis provides the most recent performance of the risk-managed momentum. 
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1.2 Research hypotheses 
In this thesis, the hypotheses are derived from the previous studies on momentum. 
Rouwenhorst (1998) shows that momentum produces positive abnormal returns in the 
European market. Therefore, the first hypothesis investigates whether or not the mo-
mentum still produces positive abnormal returns in the European market.  The first hy-
pothesis is written as follows:  
 
H0: Momentum strategy does not produce positive abnormal returns in Europe.  
 
H1: Momentum strategy does produce positive abnormal returns in Europe.  
 
Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) examine the risk-managed momentum strategy in the 
UK, France and Germany and show that it is a profitable investment strategy in all three 
countries. In this thesis, the second hypothesis examines whether or not the risk-man-
aged momentum produces positive abnormal returns in Europe and also answers one of 
the main research questions of this thesis. The first hypothesis act as a great benchmark 
for a second hypothesis. The second hypothesis is presented as follows: 
 
H2: Risk-managed momentum strategy does produce positive abnormal returns in Eu-
rope. 
 
Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) show that the risk-managed momentum also works glob-
ally. Therefore, in this thesis, the third hypothesis investigates whether or not the risk-
managed momentum produces positive abnormal returns in globally and provides the 
answer for the research question. The third hypothesis is presented as follows: 
 
H3: Risk-managed momentum strategy does produce positive abnormal returns in North 




1.3 Limitations and assumptions  
In this thesis, the limitations lie on the chosen data and time period. The thesis utilizes 
only the large stocks data, and therefore the risk-managed momentum returns might 
differ if small and medium-size stocks would have been included into data. The second 
limitation is related to time period length. Most of the risk-managed momentum studies 
use a longer time period compared to this thesis. As discussed earlier, other researchers 
have proven that the risk-managed momentum strategy is profitable. Therefore, positive 
abnormal returns of the risk-managed momentum can be expected in this thesis. How-
ever, there are not many studies that are related to risk-managed momentum. Thus, it is 
hard to say whether or not the risk-managed momentum produces positive abnormal 
returns in every research area. 
 
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis  
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: The second chapter will discuss the theo-
retical background, which includes the theory of the efficient market, asset pricing mod-
els and portfolio performance measures. The third chapter covers the previous literature 
and gives the reader a wide understanding of how momentum studies have been devel-
oped. The fourth chapter presents the data and methodology that is used in this thesis. 
The fifth chapter presents the results of the thesis and answers to the research questions. 




2 Theoretical background 
In this chapter, theory and models which are related to this thesis are presented. First, 
the efficient market hypothesis is presented. Second, the widely known asset pricing 
models are presented. Finally, portfolio performance measures are presented.  
 
 
2.1 Efficient market hypothesis 
Efficient market hypothesis plays a vital role in financial theory. It was first introduced by 
Eugene F. Fama (1970), and he shows that the efficient market hypothesis can be divided 
into three categories based on the feature of information. The categories are weak-form, 
semi strong-form and strong-form. The efficient market hypothesis shows that stocks are 
correctly priced, and therefore, it is impossible to gain excess returns on stocks. More 
precisely, any actions which affect firms are immediately in stock prices so no excess 
returns can be earned. (Fama 1970.) 
 
The first efficient market hypothesis is called the weak-form hypothesis, which means 
that stock prices already reflect all the past information regarding stocks. For example, 
the past information could be trading volumes, short interests or stock prices from the 
past. The past stock price data must be costless to obtain and publicly available. The 
weak-form hypothesis suggests that trend analysis is useless. (Bodie, Kane and Marcus 
2014: 353-354.) 
 
The second efficient market hypothesis is called semi strong-form, which means that all 
the past information of stocks and also all the publicly available information regarding 
companies’ prospects are already in stock prices. For instance, the information could be 
earning forecast, patents held and quality of management. (Bodie et al. 2014: 354.)  
 
The third efficient market hypothesis is called strong-form, which means that all relevant 
information to the company is already in stock prices. This also includes the company’s 
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insider information. All three efficient market hypothesis share one common feature 
which is that stock prices should reflect available information. (Bodie et al. 2014: 354.)  
 
Even though the efficient market hypothesis is widely known among financial practition-
ers, anomalies challenge market efficiency. The weak-form category is challenged by mo-
mentum anomaly. The weak-form category asserts that all the past information is al-
ready in the stock prices. Therefore, no positive abnormal returns can be earned based 
on past information, as discussed earlier. However, momentum anomaly considers only 
past information and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) show that momentum generates 
positive abnormal returns. The semi strong-form category is challenged by firm size and 
book-to-market (value) anomalies. The semi strong-form category suggests that positive 
abnormal returns cannot be earned by using past and publicly available information. 
However, small-firm portfolios provide a higher average return than large-firm portfolios, 
and high book-to-market firms provide higher average return than low book-to-market 
firms (Fama and French 1996.) Thus, these anomalies act as evidence that markets are 
not efficient.  
 
The strong-form category cannot be true due to trading costs and positive information. 
However, it could be used as a benchmark. Moreover, the biggest problem regarding the 
efficient market hypothesis is a joint-hypothesis problem. Market efficient is not testable 
by itself so that must be tested jointly with the equilibrium model, for example, an asset 
pricing model. (Fama 1991.)  
 
Results of the anomalies are inconsistent with asset-pricing theories. The anomalies 
show that either the asset pricing models are deficient or the market is inefficient. Often 
when anomalies are observed and presented in the academic literature, the anomalies 
effect tend to attenuate or disappear. This raises questions among the financial practi-
tioners that are the anomalies statistical aberrations or do the anomalies only exist in 
the past because investors utilize the anomalies until the anomalies disappear or atten-
uate. Thus, investors' behaviour makes the market more efficient. (Schwert 2002.) 
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2.2 Asset pricing models 
 
2.2.1 Divident Discount Model  
Dividend discount model (DDM) is a popular stock valuation model among stock market 
analysts. Analysts use the model to determine stocks intrinsic value. To calculate the 
stock’s intrinsic value, the dividend discount model takes into account future dividends 
from the current moment to perpetuity. Then the future dividends are divided by the 
required rate of return. (Bodie et al. 2014: 591-596.) 
 
The formula of the DDM can be written as follows: 
 






+ ⋯ + 
𝐷𝑡
(1+𝑘)𝑡
 ,       (1) 
 
Where 𝑉0 is current share price, 𝐷𝑡 dividend at time t and 𝑘 required rate of return. 
(Bodie et al. 2014: 595-596.) 
 
The drawbacks of equation 1. is that it needs dividend forecasts for every year into the 
indefinite future. To make the dividend discount model more practical, the constant-
growth DDM has been developed, also known as the Gordon model. Instead of forecast-
ing dividends for every year in the future, the constant growth DDM estimates constant 
growth of dividends. (Bodie et al. 2014: 596-597.) 
 
The formula of the constant-growth DDM can be written as follows:  
 
𝑉0 =  
𝐷1
𝑘−𝑔
 ,           (2) 
 




2.2.2 Free Cash Flow Model  
Free cash flow model (FCF) provides an alternative method to calculate a stock price. 
Comparing the free cash flow model to the dividend discount model, the free cash flow 
model can evaluate a firm’s stock price if the firm does not pay dividends. The free cash 
flow model estimates a firm’s free cash flows year by year and discount them with the 
weighted-average cost of capital (WACC). Finally, it takes into account a terminal value. 
The formula gives the current value of a firm, and the firm value must be divided by the 
number of outstanding shares to get a stock price value. (Bodie et al. 2014: 617-618.) 
 
The formula of the free cash flow model can be written as follows: 
 




𝑡=1 +  
𝑉𝑡
(1+𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶)𝑡
 ,       (3) 
 
𝑉𝑡 =  
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡+1
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶−𝑔
 ,           (4) 
 
Where 𝑃𝑜 is the current value of the firm, 𝐹𝐶𝐹 is the free cash flow, 𝑡 is the time period, 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 is the weighted-average cost of capital, 𝑔 is the growth rate of cash flows. (Bodie 
et al. 2014: 617-618.) 
 
 
2.2.3 Capital Asset Pricing Model  
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) was presented by William Sharpe (1964), John 
Lintner (1965) and Jan Mossin (1966). It is one of the earliest asset pricing models which 
has gained popularity among finance practitioners. The asset pricing model predicts the 
relationship between risky asset and its expected return. It lays on Harry Markowitz 
(1952) modern portfolio theory. The modern portfolio theory expects that all investors 




CAPM can be portrayed graphically as a security market line (SML) which shows expected 
returns against beta. Beta plays in a central role in CAPM where the beta measures a 
systematic risk which cannot be eliminated by diversifying a stock portfolio. The market 
beta is 1, and therefore SML slope is a risk premium of the market portfolio. The fairly 
priced stocks are precisely on SML, and if the stocks are underpriced, they plot above 
the SML and overpriced stocks plot under SML. (Bodie et al. 2014: 298-299.)   
 
The formula of the capital asset pricing model can be written as follows: 
 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖) =  𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝑓) ,        (5) 
 
Where 𝐸(𝑅𝑖) is the expected return on asset, 𝑅𝑓 is the risk-free rate, 𝛽 is the market 
beta and 𝑅𝑀 is the expected return of market portfolio. (Fama and French 2004.) 
 
Assumption of the CAPM: 
• Investors are rational and risk-averse  
• Investors have a single planning horizon 
• Investors have homogeneous beliefs and expectations  
• Investors can lend or borrow at the common risk-free rate, all short positions are 
allowed, and all assets can be traded on public exchanges 
• All information is publicly available for everyone at the same time 
• No taxes  
• No transaction costs. (Bodie et al. 2014: 304.) 
 
Three of unrealistic CAPM assumptions listed above create challenges to CAPM. These 
are, all assets can be traded, there are no transaction costs and investors have a single 
planning horizon. These challenges of CAPM assumptions have motivated other finance 
practitioners to study the unrealistic assumptions, thus leading CAPM failing in many 
empirical tests. (Bodie et al. 2014: 305.) Furthermore, CAPM fails to explain certain pat-
terns in stock returns which are called anomalies. Even though the CAPM sometimes 
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fails to explain stock returns, it stays popular among the investors due to its simple logic. 
(Fama and French 1996; 2004.) 
 
 
2.2.4 Arbitrage Pricing Theory  
The arbitrage pricing theory (ATP) was presented by Stephen Ross (1976). The ATP is 
developed to overcome the CAPM weaknesses. The CAPM assumes that the stock mar-
ket is perfectly efficient, whereas ATP assumes that markets can misprice the stocks. The 
arbitrage opportunity can be noted when the net investment is not needed, and inves-
tors can make profits without risk. However, the arbitrage opportunity can vanish quickly 
because investors can set large positions on arbitrage trades, thus forcing prices up and 
down until the arbitrage opportunities vanish. (Bodie et al. 2014: 324-328.) 
 
Returns of stocks are affected by two different risk factors that are a macroeconomic risk 
factor and firm-specific risk factor (Bodie et al. 2014: 325). Macroeconomic changes have 
a different effect on different types of stocks. For example, some stocks are more sensi-
tive to changes in interest rate, and some stocks are more sensitive to changes in oil 
prices. (Harrington 1978: 188-189.) 
 
APT assumptions can be written as: 
• Investors maximize their wealth and are unwilling to take risks 
• Investors can take loan with risk-free rate 
• No transaction costs, no taxes and short positions are allowed. (Harrington 1978: 
193.)  
 
The formula of the APT can be written as follows: 
 




Where 𝑅𝑖 is the return of asset, the 𝑟𝑓 is the risk-free rate, the 𝑏𝑖 is the factor sensitivity 
or loading, 𝐹𝑖  is the value of factor and 𝑒𝑖 is the noise error. (Brealey, Myers and Allen 
2017: 207.)  
 
 
2.2.5 Fama & French Three-Factor Model 
One of the most common asset pricing models is the three-factor model which is devel-
oped by Fama and French (1993). The model is used to explain the average excess re-
turns of securities. The three-factor model is formed by using three different factors 
which are a market factor, size factor and book-to-market ratio factor. The market factor 
is excess return on the market (RMRF), the size factor is small minus big (SMB) which 
measures the excess return of small stocks compared to large stocks, and the book-to-
market ratio is high minus low (HML) which measures the excess return of value stocks 
compared to growth stocks. (Fama and French 1993.) 
 
Fama and French (1993) show that the three-factor model is a good model to measure 
size and book-to-market portfolio returns. In a later study, Fama and French (1996) state 
that the three-factor model explains better the average variations and abnormal returns 
than the Capital Asset Pricing Model. 
 
The formula of the three-factor model can be presented as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝑏𝑖(𝑅𝑚 −  𝑅𝑓) +  𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵 +  ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝜀𝑖 ,  (7) 
 
Where 𝑅𝑖 is the expected return of portfolio, 𝑅𝑓 is the risk-free rate, 𝛼𝑖 is the estimated 
alpha, 𝑏𝑖(𝑅𝑚 −  𝑅𝑓)  is the factor sensitivity or loading for excess market returns multi-
plied by excess returns of market portfolio, 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵 is the factor sensitivity or loading for 
small minus big multiplied by returns of small minus big, ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿 is the factor sensitivity 
or loading for high minus large multiplied by returns of high minus large and 𝜀𝑖 is the 
random error variable. (Fama and French 1996.) 
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2.2.6 Fama & French Five-Factor Model 
A three-factor model has faced criticism that it does not explain all the average excess 
returns of securities. For that reason, Fama and French (2015) developed a five-factor 
model where the two new factors are profitability (RMW) and investment (CMA). The 
RMW factor is the difference of returns between robust profitability and weak profita-
bility portfolios, and the CMA factor is the difference of returns between conservative 
and aggressive portfolios. 
 
The five-factor model can be used to explain anomalous returns, and it provides better 
results than the three-factor model. However, the five-factor model can not explain low 
average returns on small stocks when companies have low profitability and companies’ 
returns behave like companies that invest a lot. (Fama and French 2015.) 
 
The formula of the five-factor model can be presented as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝑏𝑖(𝑅𝑚 −  𝑅𝑓) +  𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵 +  ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝑟𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊 +  (8) 
                     𝑐𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴 +  𝜀𝑖 ,                
 
Where 𝑅𝑖 is the expected return of portfolio, 𝑅𝑓 is the risk-free rate, 𝛼𝑖 is the estimated 
alpha, 𝑏𝑖(𝑅𝑚 −  𝑅𝑓)  is the factor sensitivity or loading for excess market returns multi-
plied by excess returns of market portfolio, 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵 is the factor sensitivity or loading for 
small minus big multiplied by returns of small minus big, ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿 is the factor sensitivity 
or loading for high minus large multiplied by returns of high minus large, 𝑟𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊 is the 
factor sensitivity or loading for robust minus weak multiplied by returns of robust minus 
weak, 𝑐𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴 is the factor sensitivity or loading for conservative minus aggressive mul-
tiplied by returns of conservative minus aggressive and 𝜀𝑖 is the random error variable. 





2.3 Portfolio performance measures 
 
2.3.1 Sharpe Ratio  
The Sharpe ratio, also known as a reward-to-volatility ratio, was introduced by William 
Sharpe (1966). The Sharpe ratio compares a portfolio’s excess return to the portfolio’s 
risk, which is a standard deviation of excess return. The higher the Sharpe ratio is, the 
more excess return the portfolio generates compared to its risk. Investment managers 
performance is often evaluated by the Sharpe ratio. (Bodie et al. 2014 134.) Even though 
the Sharpe ratio is widely used there are some drawbacks. According to Sharpe (1994), 
the Sharpe ratio does not take under consideration the correlation with other securities 
in the portfolio or current liabilities, and Sharpe ratio only takes into consideration the 
portfolio’s excess return. Despite the drawback of the Sharpe ratio, it can be used to 
improve investment portfolio.   
 
The formula of the Sharpe ratio can be written as follows: 
 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
𝑅𝑝−𝑅𝑓
𝜎𝛼
,                    (9) 
 
Where 𝑅𝑝 is the return of portfolio, 𝑅𝑓 is the risk-free return and 𝜎𝛼 is the standard de-
viation of the excess return. (Bodie et al. 2014: 134.) 
 
 
2.3.2 Treynor Ratio  
Treynor and Mazuy (1966) present the Treynor ratio to measure mutual funds perfor-
mances where the Treynor ratio measures the excess return per unit of risk. The excess 
return can be calculated by a portfolio’s return minus risk-free return, and the risk is the 
portfolio’s beta (Treynor and Mazuy 1966). Both the Treynor ratio and the Sharpe ratio 
have grown popularity among investors. The difference between the Sharpe ratio and 
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the Treynor ratio is that as the risk, Sharpe ratio uses the standard deviation of the excess 
return, whereas the Treynor ratio uses the portfolio’s beta. 
 
The formula of the Treynor ratio can be written as follows: 
 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑦𝑛𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
𝑟𝑝−𝑟𝑓
𝛽𝑝
 ,                 (10) 
 
Where 𝑟𝑝 is the return of a portfolio, 𝑟𝑓 is the risk-free rate and 𝛽𝑝 is the beta of a port-
folio. (Bodie et al. 2014: 840.) 
 
 
2.3.3 Jensen’s Alpha  
To measure portfolio performance Michael Jensen (1968) presents the Jensen’s alpha. 
The Jensen’s alpha is based on the CAPM, and it measures that how much average re-
turns portfolio has earned over the market returns when portfolio returns are predicted 
with CAPM. If the portfolio’s alpha is positive, then the manager has earned excess re-
turns. In other words, the portfolio manager has earned more than expected by a given 
level of riskiness of the portfolio.  On the other hand, if Jensen’s alpha is negative, then 
the portfolio manager has not earned any excess return. (Jensen 1968.) 
 
The formula of the Jensen’s alpha can be written as follows: 
 
𝛼 =  𝑅𝑖 − [𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝑓)] ,                 (11) 
 
Where 𝛼 is the Jensen’s alpha, 𝑅𝑖 is the return of the portfolio 𝑖, 𝑅𝑓 is the risk-free rate, 





2.3.4 Information Ratio  
Information ratio (IR) is a widely used portfolio measurement tool among investors. It 
helps investors to compare active portfolio’s relation to the benchmark, and in addition, 
it shows how much the active portfolio has generated excess returns relative to the 
benchmark. The information ratio divides portfolio’s alpha by tracking error where the 
portfolio’s alpha is portfolio’s return minus benchmark’s return, and the tracking error is 
the standard deviation of the difference between portfolio’s return and benchmark’s re-
turn. (Goodwin 1998.) 
 
The formula of the information ratio can be written as follows: 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
𝛼𝑝
𝜎(𝑒𝑝)
 ,                (12) 
 
Where 𝛼𝑝 is the portfolio alpha and 𝜎(𝑒𝑝) is the tracking error. (Bodie et al. 2014: 840.) 
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3 Literature review 
This chapter first presents the previous momentum studies where the momentum de-
velopment, benefits and drawbacks are discussed. Second, the biggest drawback, mo-
mentum crash, is discussed. Finally, to mitigate the momentum crashes the risk-manage 
momentum strategy is presented.  
 
 
3.1 Previous studies of momentum 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) show a strategy where they sell poorly performed stocks 
in the past and buy well-performed stocks in the past generating significant positive re-
turns over 3- to 12- month holding periods. For example, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
select stocks based on their prior 6-month returns and hold them for 6 months. As a 
result, the strategy generated a compounded excess return of 12,01% per year on aver-
age. Furthermore, they prove that the profitability of the momentum strategy is not due 
to delayed stock price reaction to a common factor or to momentum strategies’ system-
atic risk. 
 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) state a common opinion that overreaction and underreac-
tion of stock returns are too simplistic. To explain the pattern of returns, a more sophis-
ticated model to measure investors’ behaviour is needed. They propose that stock price 
overreaction is caused by investors who buy past winners and sell past losers, causing a 
temporary price distortion. This opinion is consistent with the study of DeLong, Shleifer, 
Summers, and Waldman (1990). From the other standpoint, Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) state that market underreacts to firms’ short-term prospects and overreacts to 
firms’ long-term prospects. 
 
The results of the momentum strategy made by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), aroused 
the interest of other researchers. For instance, Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), Dan-
iel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), Hong and Stein (1999) study the momentum 
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phenomenon, and they present behavioural models which claim that inherent biases 
cause momentum profits. In addition, Conrad and Kaul (1998) claim that momentum 
strategy profitability is caused by cross-sectional variation in expected yields not predict-
able time-series variations in stocks yields. 
 
As a later study Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) evaluate various explanations for momen-
tum strategy profitability which was documented in their earlier study (1993). They find 
that the results of momentum profits in their newest study is similar to their previous 
study, even though the sample period is eight years subsequent. It can be used as real 
evidence that the profits of momentum are not entirely due to data snooping biases. 
Furthermore, Conrad’s and Kaul’s (1998) hypothesis of momentum profits source is re-
jected by Jegadeesh and Titman (2001). The behaviour models are the best partial ex-
planation to momentum profits, however, the behaviour models should be used caution 
because momentum profits might sometimes associate with postholding period rever-
sals (Jegadeesh and Titman 2001). 
 
Rouwenhorst (1998) studies return patterns of momentum strategy within markets and 
across markets by using data from 1978 to 1995 and investigating 2190 stocks from 12 
European countries. The paper focuses only on medium-term returns. As a result, inter-
nationally diversified past winners portfolio outperformed about 1 % per month com-
pared to past losers portfolio. Rouwenhorst (1998) finds that the momentum strategies 
are loaded negatively on conventional risk factors as the market and the size, thus lead-
ing inconsistent of asset pricing models and joint hypotheses of market efficiency. Fur-
thermore, in Europe, small companies provide higher momentum returns compared to 
large companies, and momentum strategies return in Europe are significantly correlated 
to the relative strategies in the United States. 
 
Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) examine past returns of stocks to find factors 
which affect future stock returns predictability. To construct a portfolio, they use data 
from January 1977 to January 1993, and they rank the lowest stocks by abnormal 
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announcement returns and the highest stocks based on prior returns. As a result, the 
past winners' return is higher than average returns in the first subsequent year, however, 
returns are almost the same in the second and third following years. This raises questions 
about the quality of the risk-based explanation for the profitability of the momentum 
strategy. Chan et al. (1996) find an alternative explanation that momentum returns are 
related to new information in the market. They focus on how the market reacts when 
information of earnings is released, and they find out that earnings announcements have 
an impact on momentum strategy returns. In the first six months, about 41 % of price 
momentum strategy returns appear around earnings announcements dates. Moreover, 
if markets face good or bad earnings news surprise, the market average returns tend to 
move to the same direction at least next two announcements. Also, other information 
surprises tend to move market stock returns, for instance, new equity issues, stock buy-
backs and insider trading.  
 
Using a hedging strategy to minimize a dynamic exposure to a market and size factor can 
decrease monthly returns variability by 78,6 % as Grundy and Martin (2001) show in 
their study. They prove that the historical average return will not be sacrificed even the 
hedging strategy reduces monthly returns variability. Moreover, the significant risk-ad-
justed return is over 1,3 % per month when it is measured with a two-factor asset pricing 
model from August 1926 to July 1995 and three-factor Fama-French model from August 
1966 to July 1995. The risk-adjusted return is stable across subperiod but unhedged 
strategy in January exposure to a size factor and performs poorly. All in all, Grundy and 
Martin (2001) suggest that the profitability of momentum strategy can not be explained 
entirely by either reward of bearing industry risk or cross-sectional variability in required 
returns. 
 
Rouwenhorst (1998) states in his earlier paper that momentum strategies are profitable 
in 12 European countries. In Rouwenhorst’s (1999) later study, he proves that the mo-
mentum strategy works as well in emerging countries. Chan, Hameed and Tong (2000) 
examine the momentum strategy in global equity markets. By including stock market 
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indices in a momentum portfolio, they examine that does the country selection benefit 
the momentum strategy. Second, they investigate how exchange rate movement affects 
to returns of international momentum strategies. They investigate that does interna-
tional momentum generate profits due to interdependence because profits of interna-
tional momentum depending on the interrelationship between equity and currency mar-
ket. The third main question in their paper is that does the trading volume information 
affect to momentum strategies profitability. They argue that a low trading volume can 
cause an underreaction to stock prices, thus generating a profitable momentum strategy 
opportunity.  
 
As a result, Chan et al. (2000) find significant results of momentum strategy profitability 
in a short time period. The evidence shows that momentum profits can be increased by 
exploiting exchange rates. However, the major source of increased momentum profits 
come from price continuations in individual stock indices. Also, evidence shows that non-
synchronous trading does not explain the profits of momentum completely, and profits 
are not confined to emerging markets. Furthermore, Chan et al. (2000) implement the 
momentum strategy to markets where trading volume increases in the previous period, 
and they measure higher profits of the momentum strategy.   
 
Several studies suggest that high macroeconomic risk is the reason for momentum prof-
its. Griffin, Ji and Martin (2003) use large international data over 40 countries to examine 
the relation between momentum and macroeconomic risk. First, they document large 
profits of momentum strategy when there is weak comovement between countries. The 
result indicates that if momentum returns are explained by country-specific risk. Second, 
they use the unconditional model of Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) to measure profits of 
momentum in 17 markets. The result indicates no significant profits in abroad or in the 
United States. Third, they measure momentum profits in 16 markets by using a condi-
tional forecasting model of Chordia and Shivakumar (2002). They document that winner 
stocks earn higher returns in future than loser stocks. Fourth, momentum profits are 
compared with different economic climates like GDP growth and aggregate stock market 
26 
 
movements. As a result, Griffin et al. (2003) document positive profits of momentum in 
all macroeconomic states. Furthermore, documents indicate that profits reverse after 
investment period and in longer horizons, profits become negative. 
 
Antoniou, Lam and Paudyal (2007) examine in their paper that can behaviour biases and 
cycle variables explain profitable of momentum strategies in three main European coun-
tries as Germany, France and the UK. They use Avramov and Chordia (2006) conditional 
asset pricing model to investigate how business cycle patterns show profits of momen-
tum in the markets of three European countries. Also, they investigate how to use busi-
ness cycle variables to predict momentum profits in European markets. Second, Anto-
niou et al. (2007) enchase the Avramov and Chordia (2006) conditional model to explain 
how investors behaviour affects to time series and cross-sectional patterns of stock re-
turns by including behavioural characteristics to conditional model. As a result, Antoniou 
et al. (2007) show that European momentum returns can be explained by asset mispric-
ing that systemically varies with global business conditions. This indicates that stock re-
turn idiosyncratic risk does not explain the returns of the momentum strategy in Europe. 
Moreover, their result shows that behaviour does not explain momentum returns and is 
not correlated to the business cycle. Also, the momentum patterns are risk-based and 
behavioural variables does not affect them. 
 
Chui, Titman and Wei (2010) investigate in their paper how momentum strategies are 
affected by cultural differences. They use the individualism index, developed by Hofstede 
(2001), to investigate cross-country differences, and more specifically, they examine how 
behavioural biases affect momentum returns. They indicate significant results of cross-
country differences in momentum. Countries which have generated the most momen-
tum returns in the first half tend to generate the most momentum returns in the second 
half, however, some these differences can be explained by adding the Hofstede individ-
ualism measure. Explaining cross-countries differences in momentum returns challenge 
the risk-based and behavioural theories. The risk-based theory explains why momentum 
returns are risky in Europe and the U.S. but not in most East Asian countries and Japan. 
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The behavioural theory explains why some countries are affected by psychological biases 
that cause momentum. Furthermore, the evidence in the paper shows that culture has 
an important role in stock return patterns. Correlation between cultural differences and 
momentum profits is that cultures which are less individualistic trust less to information 
created by themselves and trust more to information made by their peers. (Chui et al. 
2010.)  
 
Many studies have measured momentum returns everywhere. Fama and French (2012) 
use four regions North America, Europe, Japan and Asia Pacific to examine the value 
premiums in average stock returns. They document value premiums in all regions, and 
strong momentum returns in all regions except Japan. Moreover, they find evidence that 
firm size affects international value premiums and momentum returns, however, in Ja-
pan, the value premiums are larger to small stocks. The spread of winner minus loser in 
momentum returns reduce from smaller to bigger stocks, but in Japan, there are no mo-
mentum returns documented in any size group.   
 
Many researchers show that specific characteristics of stocks affect to momentum strat-
egy returns. Momentum profits tend to be higher with stocks that have high market-to-
book ratios (Kent and Titman 1999), low analyst coverage (Hong et al. 2000) and high 
analyst forecast dispersion (Zhang 2006; Verardo 2009). Stocks' certain characteristics 
that affect momentum returns support the behaviour theory (Bandarchuk and Hilscher 
2013). Many researchers also document that momentum returns tend to be higher dur-
ing a high turnover of stocks (Lee and Swaminathan 2000) and high-risk credit ratings of 
stocks (Avramov, Chordia, Jostova and Philipov 2007). 
 
Bandarchuk and Hilscher (2013) argue in their paper that there is a common channel 
which can explain that momentum returns are higher with specific characteristics. First, 
they show that there is no benefit to determine a momentum strategy on stock-level 
characteristics. Therefore, in the investment point of view, to maximize momentum re-
turns the strategy should focus on past returns. Second, momentum explanation has to 
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consider momentum profits, volatility and past return as a starting point. Furthermore, 
they argue that information uncertainty like analyst forecast dispersion and analyst cov-
erage does not affect to abnormal returns of momentum when their connection in the 
past is observed. 
 
Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013) study value and momentum investing globally 
across asset classes and find evidence of a common structure among their profits as re-
turns correlate strongly across asset classes.  The behaviour theories have difficulties to 
explain the strong correlation structure among value and momentum strategies across 
asset classes. Value and momentum portfolios' high Sharpe ratio of a global across asset 
classes and high profits also cause difficulties to explain the value and momentum strat-
egies' returns by rational risk-based models. Furthermore, they show that a correlation 
structure is explained partially by funding liquidity risk. 
 
Asness, Frazzini, Israel and Moskowitz (2014) study different myths related to momen-
tum in their paper, and they use the simplest data from Kenneth French’s website. They 
present annualized mean spread returns and Sharpe ratios for RMRF, SMB, HML and 
UMD portfolios. The RMRF represents the equity market risk premium, SMB represents 
the size portfolio, HML represents the value portfolio and UMD represents the momen-
tum portfolio. The sample periods are divided into three periods. The first period uses 
data from 1927 to 2013, the second period uses data from 1963 to 2013 and the third 





Table 1. Returns and Sharpe ratios of Factor Portfolios in different time periods. (Asness et al. 
2014.) 
 
In table 1, UMD portfolio presents the highest returns and Sharpe ratios in the sample 
period 1927 – 2013 and 1963 – 2013. In the period 1991 – 2013, Sharpe ratio and returns 
are highest for the RMRF portfolio. Momentum benefits in terms of Sharpe ratio are a 
little smaller than in terms of raw spread returns. This has caused some critics among 
the researches. All in all, the Sharpe ratio and raw returns for the UMD portfolio are 
higher than for the other portfolios in the fulltime sample. (Asness et al. 2014) Despite 
the success of the momentum strategy, many researchers argue that trading costs limit 
the profitability of the momentum strategy, for example, Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) use 
intraday data, and they prove that trading costs limit the momentum strategy returns. 
 
Novy-Mark (2012) examines a momentum returns and use all stocks price information 
in the Center for Research in Securities Prices universe from January 1926 to December 
2010. The portfolio is constructed each month by selling losers and buying winners. As a 
result, recent winners that were losers in an intermediate horizon underperformed sig-
nificantly to recent losers which were winners in the intermediate horizon. The result 
does not support the traditional momentum where winners tend to rise, and losers tend 
to fall. Moreover, the results show that momentum strategy works in the US securities, 
currencies, international equity indices, investment styles, industries and commodities 
when momentum portfolio is constructed based on the intermediate horizon. 
 
The deviation between the intermediate horizon and traditional momentum results 
makes it difficult to explain momentum by models. The most common explanations are 
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based on biases, thus interpret of investors information generate positive short-lag au-
tocorrelation in prices, for example, news affect slowly in security prices, causing price 
momentum. According to a rational explanation, a positive correlation is measured be-
tween risk exposure and past performance which generate a short-lag autocorrelation 
in prices. Furthermore, to improve a profitably of a momentum strategy, understanding 
the intermediate horizon role in momentum portfolio construction is important because 
it does improve not only profitability but also a Sharpe ratio. (Novy-Marx 2012).  
 
Strategies based on the intermediate horizon are more profitable than strategies based 
on recent past performance (Novy-Marx 2012). Gong, M Liu and Q Liu (2015) study in 
their paper these two momentum strategies in 26 major international markets and the 
US. They exclude prior months 2 and 12 from recent and intermediate past horizons and 
compare these strategies. As a result, they document that the effect of the intermediate 
past return momentum is overestimated. However, including prior month 2 in the recent 
past horizon underestimates the recent momentum strategy's effect. Furthermore, by 
excluding two specific months from these two momentum strategies, they find that the 
profitability is small and insignificant between these recent and intermediate past hori-
zon strategies. 
 
Recent and intermediate momentum strategies are also investigated in international 
stock markets. Excluding prior months 2 and 12 from momentum construction, the in-
termediate momentum is not more profitable than the recent past momentum in any 
market. Thus, an investor should take advantage of the recent past momentum. However, 
these two momentum strategies contain different information and therefore, cannot re-
place each other. There is not a significant difference in strategies’ predictability based 
on the returns of stocks from past 3-11 months. (Gong et al. 2015) 
 
After a panic state when markets are recovering, the loser stocks are gaining more than 
winner stocks, causing a momentum crash to momentum strategies. When market vol-
atility is high in the bear market, past losers’ up-market betas are large, but down-market 
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betas are low. Thus, past losers expected returns are very high, and the momentum ef-
fect is reversed. During the good times, the attribute does not exist in the winner stocks, 
but during the extreme times, an asymmetric exists in loser and winner exposure to re-
turns of the market.  (Daniel and Moskowitz 2016.) 
 
Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) examine the impact and potential predictability of momen-
tum crashes in multiple time periods and get consistent results in eight different markets 
and asset classes in their paper. They use ex-ante volatility estimates and bear market 
indicators to forecast a conditional mean and variance of momentum strategies. As a 
result, they double a Sharpe ratio of a static momentum strategy by creating a simple 
dynamically weighted momentum portfolio. Moreover, they prove that momentum 
crash periods are predictable. 
 
Using a cumulative monthly return from 1927 to 2013 in a momentum portfolio, the 
winners significantly outperform the losers. The winner strategy excess return on aver-
age is 15,3 % per year, and the loser strategy average excess return per year is -2,5 % 
while the average excess return of the market is 7,6 %.  For the winner portfolio, the 
Sharpe ratio is 0,71 and for the market that is 0,40. A beta of the winner minus loser 
portfolio, over the sample period, is -0,58 and unconditional capital asset pricing model 
alpha is 22,3 % per year for the WML portfolio. An ex-post optimal combination of the 
WML and market portfolio has a double Sharpe ratio compared to the market. Thus, the 
result is consistent with the high alpha. (Daniel and Moskowitz 2016.)  
 
In recent years, many researchers have study how macroeconomic risks affect momen-
tum returns. Ji, Martin and Yao (2017) use data from 1947 to 2014 in the United States 
to study how the momentum profits can be explained by macroeconomic risks. They find 
that losers and winners have different macroeconomic loadings in January when the los-
ers overcome the winners. However, the different factor loadings disappear at the end 
of the year if the momentum does exist. Furthermore, they show that macroeconomic 
risk can not explain the momentum profits. 
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Maio and Philip (2018) estimate in their paper that are macroeconomic variables valid 
factors in multifactor asset pricing models to explain momentum-based anomalies. They 
build a two-factor model where the second factor represents macroeconomic variables 
that are directly related to economic activities, and the other factor represents Merton’s 
(1973) Intertemporal CAPM. As a result, Maio and Philip (2018) show that two-factor 
ICAPM model can explain both industrial momentum and price momentum. 
 
Garcia-Feijoo, R. Jensen and K. Jensen (2018) study how the macroeconomic factors af-
fect momentum returns. More specifically, they examine how funding condition affects 
momentum returns. They find that winners tend to overcome losers during restrictive 
funding states, but during expansive states, winners and losers perform similarly. A plau-
sible reason for momentum returns behaviour is that loser stocks are more illiquid dur-
ing restrictive states and for loser stock liquidity risk is priced higher during the restrictive 
states (Garcia-Feijoo et al. 2018). 
 
 
3.2 Momentum crash 
A momentum strategy average returns are significant and large, but during history, there 
have been periods when the momentum strategy has underperformed dramatically. Two 
main crashes are measured from June 1932 to December 1939 and from March 2009 to 
March 2013. In these two periods, the loser portfolio outperforms compared to winner 
portfolio. In the period from March 2009 to March 2013, the loser portfolio generates 
twice as much profit than winner portfolio.  In the period from June 1932 to December 
1939, the losers generate 50 % more profit than the winners. Even though the winner 
portfolio outperforms the loser portfolio over time, the alpha and the Sharpe ratio suffer 
significantly from the crashes. When winner portfolios are compared to loser portfolios, 
the winner portfolio is more negatively skewed in extreme deciles. Winner portfolio 
monthly skewness is -0,82, and daily skewness is -0,61 while loser portfolio monthly 




The momentum crashes occur after a panic state when markets are recovering. The loser 
stocks are gaining more than winner stocks, causing a momentum crash to momentum 
strategies. The biggest losses of momentum strategy are measured during the two big-
gest crashes in the stock market. In July and August 1932, the momentum strategy faces 
the worst months. A market decreases by 90 % from the peak of 1929. Furthermore, the 
April and May in 1933 are the sixth and 12th worst momentum months. The March and 
April in 2009 are the seventh and fourth worst momentum months and three of the ten 
worst momentum months are measured in 2009. (Daniel and Moskowitz 2016.)  
 
 
Figure 1. Cumulative returns of the market minus risk free-rate portfolio (RMRF) and the plain 
momentum portfolio (WML) during the momentum crashes. (Barroso and Santa-Clara 2015.) 
 
Figure 1 presents the performance of momentum strategy in the 1930s and the 2000s. 
In July and August 1932, the momentum strategy's cumulative return is -91,59 %, and 
from March to May in 2009, momentum strategy suffers from the crash and has a cumu-
lative return of -73,42 %. These crashes have a permanent effect on momentum strategy 
returns. For instance, 1 dollar invested in a momentum strategy in July 1932, takes 31 
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years that the value recovers from the crash. This constructs a risk of momentum invest-
ing. (Barroso and Santa-Clara 2015.) 
 
 
3.3 Risk-managed momentum 
Barroso and Santa Clara (2015) use a risk-managed momentum strategy to improve the 
profitability of the momentum portfolio. To do so, the risk of momentum is calculated 
from the realized variance of daily returns. From the realized variance, they calculate 
realized volatility in the previous six months and target to constant volatility. They scale 
the momentum portfolio by the ratio of the constant volatility target divided by realized 
volatility. As a result, the Sharpe ratio and skewness values improve greatly. 
 
 
Table 2. The first row presents the economic performance of the plain momentum, and the sec-
ond row presents the economic performance of the risk-managed momentum. The mean, stand-
ard deviation, Sharpe ratio and information ratio are annualized, and others are given in monthly 
figures. The time period is from 1927:03 to 2011:12. (Barroso and Santa-Clara 2015.) 
 
Table 2 shows the result of the risk-managed momentum portfolio from 1927 to 2011. 
The risk-managed momentum has a higher average return of 2,04 % per year and 10,58 % 
less standard deviation compared to plain momentum. The risk-managed momentum 
almost doubles the Sharpe ratio from 0,53 to 0,97, and Information ratio has a high value 
of 0,78. (Barroso and Santa-Clara 2015.)  
 
Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) argue that increasing turnover in risk-managed momen-
tum might offset the risk-managed momentum's benefits after transaction costs. They 
control this by calculating risk-managed momentum and plain momentum turnovers 
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from the firm size and stock-level data on returns from 1951 to 2010. As a result, the 
turnover of the momentum per month is 74 %, and the risk-managed momentum turn-
over per month is 75 %. The turnover increases only 1 % and an AR(1) coefficient of 0,97, 
which is constant from month to month. Therefore, the increase in turnover is not ade-
quate to eliminate volatility scaling benefits. Furthermore, they use round-trip cutoff 
cost to find what is the cost of transactions for momentum strategies. They find that 
transaction costs reduce the risk-managed momentum returns significantly, and the 
transaction costs are smaller for the plain momentum. 
 
In turbulence times, the risk-managed momentum benefits are important. The risk-man-
aged momentum strategy decreases the skewness from -2,47 to -0,42 and lowers the 
excess kurtosis from a value 18,24 to 2,68. Figure 2 shows that managing the risk of the 
momentum during momentum crashes in 1930-1939 and 2000-2009 provides significant 
benefits. The risk-managed momentum managed to maintain its value in the 1930s, 
however, the plain momentum lost 90 % of investment value. From 2000 to 2009 the 
plain momentum lost 28 % of its value due to the momentum crash. The risk-managed 
momentum value is 88 % higher in 2009 than it was in 2000 because it managed to avoid 
the momentum crash.  (Barroso and Santa-Clara 2015.) 
 
Figure 2. Cumulative returns of the plain momentum portfolio (WML) and the risk-managed mo-
mentum portfolio (WML*) during the momentum crashes. (Barroso and Santa-Clara 2015.) 
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4 Data and methodology 
 
4.1 Data  
In this thesis, all the data is obtained from Kenneth French’s website. The datasets con-
tain daily and monthly returns for the stock portfolios in Europe, North America, Japan 
and Asia-Pacific. The European portfolio includes stocks from Austria, Belgium, Switzer-
land, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Great-Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. The Japan portfolio only includes stocks 
from Japan. The North America portfolio includes stocks from Canada and the United 
States. The Asia-Pacific portfolio includes stocks from Australia, Hong Kong, New Zealand 
and Singapore. The time period for the datasets is from January 1995 to December 2019. 
Stocks are divided into five size groups based on the market cap. The highest size group 
is constructed of the largest stocks from the market that comprise 90 % of the total mar-
ket capitalization. Then the momentum quintiles are formed by subdividing each size 
group into five momentum quintiles. The momentum quintile return is stock’s cumula-
tive return from t-12 to t-2. The lowest momentum quintile represents the bottom 20 % 
lowest stocks, and the highest quantile momentum represents the top 20 % highest 
stocks. The portfolios are formed at the end of the month t-1, and the same portfolio 
construction procedure is used every month. In each portfolio, the individual stocks are 
value-weighted, and all returns are in U.S. dollars. (French 2020.) Chaves' (2012) inter-
national momentum study avoid the illiquid stocks by selecting only the largest and the 
most liquid stocks. Therefore, in this study, I focus only on the biggest size group.  
 
The Fama-French three-factor model values for all four regions are downloaded from 
Kenneth French’s website. Datasets contain monthly returns and the time period is from 
January 1995 to December 2019. The market factor is constructed by calculating the re-
turns on region’s value-weighted portfolio minus the one-month risk-free rate, which is 
the U.S. one-month T-bill rate. The SMB factor is constructed by calculating the average 
of the returns on the three small stock portfolios for the region and subtracting the 
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average of the returns on the three big stock portfolios for the region. The HML factor is 
constructed by calculating the average of the returns on the two high B/M portfolios for 
the region and subtracting the average of the returns on the two low B/M portfolios for 
the region. All returns are in U.S. dollars. (French 2020) 
 
The Fama-French five-factor model values for all four regions are downloaded from Ken-
neth French’s website. Datasets contain monthly returns. The same risk-free rate and 
time period are used than in the previous three-factor model. The market and HML fac-
tors are constructed in the same way than in the three-factor model. The SMB factor is 
constructed by calculating the average return on the nine small stock portfolios and sub-
tracting the average return on the nine big stock portfolios. The RWM factor is con-
structed by calculating the average return on the two robust operating profitability port-
folios and subtracting the average return on the two weak operating profitability portfo-
lios. The CMA factor is formed by calculating the average return on the two conservative 
investment portfolios and subtracting the average return on the two aggressive invest-
ment portfolios. All returns are in U.S. dollars. (French 2020) 
 
 
4.2 Methodology  
To calculate the risk-managed momentum returns, the momentum portfolio returns are 
calculated first. It is widely known that the momentum portfolio returns can be calcu-
lated by winner stocks minus loser stocks. Therefore, in this thesis, the momentum port-
folio daily and monthly returns of the largest stocks are calculated by the highest quintile 
(past winners) minus the lowest quintile (past losers). 
 
After the momentum portfolio returns have been calculated, it is time to calculate the 
risk-managed momentum returns. In this thesis, I follow Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) 
procedure to form and calculate the risk-managed momentum returns. First, they calcu-
late for each month a variance forecast from previous six-month daily returns of momen-
tum portfolio. They also use one-month, three-month realized variances and 
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exponentially weighted moving average. As a result, they notice that all the options give 
nearly similar results. Therefore, in this thesis, the simplest one-month realized variance 
is used to calculate the variance forecast. Below is the formula for the variance forecast 
(Barroso and Santa-Clara 2015):  
 
?̂?𝑊𝑀𝐿,𝑡
2 =  21 ∑ 𝑟𝑊𝑀𝐿,𝑑𝑡−1−𝑗
220
𝑗=0 /21 ,      (13) 
 
Where, the ?̂?𝑡
2 is forecasted variance of the month 𝑡 and the 𝑟𝑊𝑀𝐿,𝑑𝑡−1−𝑗
2  is squared daily 
returns in the previous month.  
 
To calculate the risk-managed momentum returns Barroso and Santa Clara (2015) scale 
the monthly returns of the plain momentum portfolio by the ratio of the constant vola-
tility target level divided by forecasted volatility. The momentum strategy can be scaled 
without constrains because it is a zero-investment and self-financing strategy. Below is 
the formula for the risk-managed momentum returns (Barroso and Santa-Clara 2015):  
 
𝑟𝑊𝑀𝐿∗,𝑡 =  
𝜎𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡
𝜎𝑡
𝑟𝑊𝑀𝐿,𝑡 ,        (14) 
 
Where 𝑟𝑊𝑀𝐿∗,𝑡 is the return of risk-managed momentum, 𝜎𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 is the constant volatil-
ity target level, 𝜎𝑡 is the annualized forecasted volatility which can be calculated by mul-
tiplying square root  twelve with the square root of the monthly forecasted variance, 
𝑟𝑊𝑀𝐿,𝑡 is the return of the plain momentum portfolio.  
 
The ratio between constant volatility target level and annualized forecasted volatility 
represents weights for the risk-managed momentum, and the weights vary every month. 
Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) choose to use 12 % as the level of the constant volatility 
target. In this thesis, I use the annualized market average volatility as the level of the 
constant volatility target. It is calculated by using volatility from the whole market 
monthly data and then multiplied the obtained volatility by square root twelve. The 
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constant volatility target level for Europe is 16,96 %, for North America it is 15,03 %, for 
Japan it is 17,18 % and for Asia-Pacific it is 20,02 %.  
 
Fama and French (2015) use asset pricing models to test whether the momentum port-
folios produce positive abnormal returns. Therefore, to test the three hypotheses of this 
thesis, the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is used. The FF3 and FF5 factors act 
as independent variables of the regressions. Monthly returns of the plain momentum 
and risk-managed momentum act as dependent variables. In order to accept the hypoth-
eses 1-3, both FF3 and FF5 factor models’ dependent variables should be statistically 
significant at the 5 % level. In this thesis, all regressions are Newey-West (1987) corrected 




In this chapter, the results of the empirical models are presented, and all the hypotheses 
will be answered. First, the cumulative returns of the plain momentum, risk-managed 
momentum and market minus risk-free rate portfolio in the most turbulence time are 
plotted in the figure 3.  Second, the results of the plain momentum and the risk-managed 
momentum in Europe are presented and discussed. Third, global results of the plain 
momentum and risk-managed momentum are presented and discussed. 
 
 
Figure 3. Cumulative returns of the plain momentum (WML), the risk-managed momentum 
(WML*) and the market minus risk-free rate portfolio (RMRF) during the period January 2000 – 
December 2009.  
 
Figure 3 represents cumulative returns of the plain momentum, the risk-managed mo-
mentum and the market minus risk-free rate portfolio in the most turbulent time in the 
2000s. The time period spans from January 2000 to December 2009, and it shows how 
a dollar investment has developed during the time period. A dollar invested in the plain 
momentum portfolio at the beginning of time period is worth of 0,74 dollars at the end 





































dollars and risk-managed momentum portfolio is worth of 2,54 dollars. Figure 3 shows a 
momentum crash risk related to plain momentum strategy. Before the financial crisis in 
2009, the cumulative return of the plain momentum portfolio is 1,72 dollars. Due to the 
financial crisis, the plain momentum portfolio return suffers a drop, and it ends up with 
a lower value than market minus risk-free rate portfolio which is similar than Barroso 
and Santa Clara’s (2015) results in U.S. market. Because of the riskiness of plain momen-
tum strategy, it is interesting to compare cumulative returns development of the risk-
managed momentum and the plain momentum. Both portfolios’ cumulative returns be-
have at approximately the same way. In the early 2000s, both cumulative returns de-
crease, but the plain momentum portfolio suffers a higher decline in returns. At the end 
of the sample period, both portfolios’ cumulative returns growth, however, cumulative 
returns of the risk-managed momentum portfolio increase faster. Before the financial 
crises, the risk-managed momentum returns have a value of 3,28 dollars, and due to 
financial crises, the risk-managed momentum portfolio suffers a 28,12 % drop while the 
plain momentum portfolio suffers a 58,66 % drop. Thus, it can be said that this provides 
one evidence that risk-managed momentum limits a crash risk of momentum strategy. 
 
Table 3 presents a descriptive statistic for the plain momentum (WML) and risk-managed 
momentum (WML*) in the full sample period. It is interesting to compare that is the risk-
managed momentum more profitable and less risky strategy than the plain momentum 
strategy in Europe. First, the WML* provides higher single month maximum return and 
lower single month minimum return than the WML strategy. The maximum return 
month is 1,67 % higher for WML*. The WML* suffers -22,25 % drop in returns, whereas 
the WML suffers -33,70 % drop in returns. The result of the minimum month return is in 
line with Barroso and Santa Clara’s (2015) findings. However, they find that the maximum 
month return is higher for the plain momentum strategy.  This might be a result with the 
different market area, time period, momentum portfolio construction or target volatility 




Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the plain momentum (WML) and the risk-managed momentum 
(WML*). The mean average excess return, the standard deviation and the Sharpe ratio are an-
nualized, and others are given in monthly figures. The time period is from 1995:01 to 2019:12. 
 
In table 3, the mean average excess return per year is 13,89 % for the WML* strategy, 
and for the WML strategy, the mean average excess return per year is 6,59 %. Thus, it 
can be said that the risk-managed momentum is a more profitable strategy in terms of 
mean return. The annualized standard deviation of the WML* is 20,33 %, and the annu-
alized standard deviation of the WML is 22,02 %. Thus, the risk-managed momentum 
provides a smaller dispersion to returns than the plain momentum. Barroso and Santa 
Clara (2015) get similar results, and they measure the annualized average excess return 
of 16,50 % for the risk-managed momentum and annualized standard deviation of 
19,95 %. For the plain momentum, they measure the annualized average excess return 
of 14,46 % and annualized standard deviation of 27,53 %. 
 
Managing the risk of the WML strategy improves the kurtosis and skewness. In table 3, 
the WML* strategy lowers the kurtosis from 7,03 to 4,36 and improves the skewness 
from -0,57 to 0,26. Barrosso and Santa Clara (2015) get roughly the similar results, how-
ever, they report that the skewness of the risk-managed momentum is negative even 
though the skewness is improved when managing the risk of the momentum. They argue 
that improvement in kurtosis and skewness lower the momentum crash risk greatly. 
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Therefore, the risk-managed momentum in Europe reduces the momentum crash risk 
substantially and even virtually eliminates it due to positive skewness and kurtosis values 
near to normal distribution. Moreover, the WML* enhances the Sharpe ratio from 0,30 
to 0,68. The increase in Sharpe ratio is mostly due to an increase in annualized mean 
return and not due to a decrease in annualized standard deviation. The improvement in 
Sharpe ratio tells that the risk-managed momentum is a more profitable strategy than 
plain momentum strategy, which is in line with the Barroso and Santa Clara’s (2015) re-
sults and also similar than Grobys, Ruotsalainen and Äijö’s (2018) risk-managed indus-
trial momentum results. 
 
Next, table 4 presents the results that answer to hypothesis 1 and 2. The FF3 regression’s 
alpha intercept for the WML is statistically significant at the 1 % level and produces a 
significant abnormal monthly return of 0,936 %. The FF5 regression’s alpha intercept for 
the WML is not statistically significant. Thus, this thesis rejects the hypothesis 1 and the 
hypothesis 0 holds, which means that the plain momentum strategy does not produce 
statistically significant positive abnormal returns in Europe. The FF3 and FF5 regressions 
show that the alpha intercepts for the WML* are statistically significant at the 1 % level. 
The FF3 regression shows that the WML* produces a significant abnormal monthly re-
turn of 1,374 %, and the FF5 regression shows that the WML* offers a significant abnor-
mal monthly return of 1,095 %. Thus, this thesis accepts the hypothesis 2, which means 
that the risk-managed momentum produces statistically significant positive abnormal 
returns in Europe. Now to one of the main research questions has been answered. All in 
all, the risk-managed momentum provides higher alpha intercepts than plain momen-
tum strategy when the intercepts are measured by FF3 and FF5 regressions. Thus, it can 
be said that risk-managed momentum is more profitable investment strategy than the 





Table 4. The table summarizes the Fama-French 3-factor model (FF3) regression and Fama-
French 5-factor model (FF5) regression whole sample results from 1995:01 to 2019:12. Alpha is 
the intercept of the regression, and the factor loadings are RMRF (market return minus risk-free 
rate), SMB (small minus big), HML (high minus low), RMW (robust minus weak) and CMA (con-
servative minus aggressive). WML is the plain momentum and WML* is the risk-managed mo-
mentum. All regressions are Newey-West (1987) corrected for autocorrelation and heterosce-
dasticity.  Statistically significant: 1) *** on a 1 % level, 2) ** on a 5 % level, 3) * on a 10 % level.  
 
It is interesting to look at the factor loadings in table 4. More specifically, that are the 
factor loadings significant and what is the explanatory power of the FF3 and FF5 models. 
When WML returns are explained by FF3 model, only one independent variable has a 
significant coefficient at the 1 % level, and that is RMRF. It has a factor loading of -0,389, 
and that indicates that WML returns move partially to the opposite direction than 
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market returns. The HML factor loading is statistically significant at the 10 % level and 
has a loading of -0,616. When WML* returns are explained by FF3 model, the HML co-
efficient is significant, and it has a factor loading of -0,527 and p-value of 0,027. Negative 
loading of HML means that WML* returns can be explained by growth firms. All other 
coefficients are insignificant in FF3 model. When WML returns are explained by FF5 
model, the RMRF and RMW have significant coefficients, and other independent varia-
bles have insignificant coefficients. The RMRF factor has a negative loading of -0,289 and 
p-value of 0,006. It indicates that MWL returns have a negative co-movement with the 
market. The RMW factor has a positive loading of 1,121 and p-value of 0,011 which 
means that firms that are operating profitable explain the WML returns. When the FF5 
model explains WML* returns, only the RMW coefficient is statistically significant among 
the other coefficients of the independent variables. It has a positive factor loading of 
0,605 and p-value of 0,041. It indicates that WML* returns can be explained by firms 
that are operating profitably. Furthermore, the FF5 model has better explanatory power 
than the FF3 model. For the WML returns the FF5 model adjusted R-squared is 0,224 
whereas FF3 model adjusted R-squared is 0,178. This means that the FF5 model explains 
22,4 % of the WML returns, whereas FF3 model explains 17,8 % of the WML returns. 
Both models explain better the WML returns than the WML* returns. The FF3 model 
only explains 6,5 % of WML* returns and the FF5 model do a little bit better job and 
explains 7,9 % of WML* returns. 
 
Barroso and Santa Clara (2015) test the robustness of the risk-managed momentum by 
dividing the whole time period into different subsamples. Their first subsample is from 
1927:03 to 1969:12, the second subsample is from 1970:01 to 2011:12, the third sub-
sample is from 1945:01 to 2005:12 and fourth subsample is from 1927:03 to 2011:12 
where the crashes in 1932 and in 2009 are excluded. In this paper, the whole time period 
is divided into four different subsamples to check the plain momentum and risk-man-
aged momentum results in Europe. The first subsample (first-period) is from 1995:01 to 
2003:04, the second subsample (second-period) is from 2003:05 to 2011:08, the third 
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subsample (third-period) is from 2011:09 to 2019:12 and the fourth subsample (no crash) 
is from 1995:01 to 2019:12 where the financial crisis in 2009 is excluded.  
 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for the plain momentum (WML) and the risk-managed momentum 
(WML*) in different subsamples. The first period covers 1995:01-2003:04, the second period co-
vers 2003:05-2011:08, the third period covers 2011:09-2019:12 and the no crash period covers 
1995:01-2019:12 where the financial crisis in 2009 is excluded. The mean average excess return, 
the standard deviation and the Sharpe ratio are annualized, and others are given in monthly 
figures. 
 
In table 5, the results are mostly the same as in the whole sample descriptive statistics 
table 3. The maximum return of the month is higher for the WML* than the WML in 
every subsample except in the second period. In the second period, the maximum month 
return is 4,74 % lower for the WML*. The minimum month returns are better for the 
WML* in every subsample. In the point of minimum month return, the WML* provides 
the biggest benefits in the second period. The minimum month return is -13,75 % for 
WML* whereas the minimum month return is -33.70 % for the WML. The minimum 
month return results are in line with Barroso and Santa Clara’s (2015) findings. 
 
The annualized mean excess returns in table 5 are higher in every subsample for the 
WML* and the results support the whole sample descriptive results. The biggest annu-
alized mean excess return for the WML* is 19,80 % which is measured in the first period. 
The lowest annualized mean excess return for the WML* is 7,53 % in the third period. 
The WML suffers the lowest annualized mean excess return 4,80 % in the second period, 
which is mostly caused by the financial crisis in 2009. In the same period, the WML* 
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produces annualized mean excess return of 14,34 %. This support the assumption that 
risk-managed momentum mitigates the negative effect of the momentum crash. More-
over, the annualized standard deviation is lower for the WML in the third period, but in 
all other periods, the WML* produces lower standard deviations. 
 
Kurtosis in table 5 is lower for the WML* than the WML except in the first period. The 
biggest reduction of the kurtosis happens in the second period when kurtosis drops from 
12,82 to 5,59 when managing the risk of the momentum. The WML produces mostly 
negative skewness values in all subsample periods while WML* can improve skewness 
of WML and it produces only positive skewness values in all subsample periods. This is 
robust evidence that risk-managed momentum eliminates virtually the crash risk associ-
ated with plain momentum. Furthermore, WML* generates higher Sharpe ratio in all 
subsample periods compared to WML.  The biggest difference of the Sharpe ratio is in 
the second period when Sharpe ratio of WML is only 0,22, and Sharpe ratio of WML* is 
0,80. Even in the no crash period, the WML* almost doubles the Sharpe ratio. The higher 
Sharpe ratio, in every period, is robust evidence that risk-managed momentum is a more 
profitable strategy than the plain momentum strategy and these results are also in line 
with Barroso and Santa Clara’s (2015) findings.   
 
Next, the robustness tests are formed to FF3 and FF5 regressions and the same subsam-
ple periods are used than in the descriptive statistics robustness test. Table 6 shows the 
FF3 regression’s robustness test results for the WML and WML* and table 7 presents the 











Table 6. The table summarizes the Fama-French 3-factor model (FF3) regression results in differ-
ent subsamples. The first period covers 1995:01-2003:04, the second period covers 2003:05-
2011:08, the third period covers 2011:09-2019:12 and the no crash period covers 1995:01-
2019:12 where the financial crisis in 2009 is excluded. Alpha is the intercept of the regression, 
and the factor loadings are RMRF (market return minus risk-free rate), SMB (small minus big) 
and HML (high minus low). WML is the plain momentum and WML* is the risk-managed mo-
mentum. All regressions are Newey-West (1987) corrected for autocorrelation and heterosce-




The alpha intercepts of the WML strategy are mostly statistically significant in table 6. In 
the first and the second period, the alpha intercepts are statistically significant at the 10 % 
level, but in the third period, the alpha intercept is not statistically significant. The no 
crash period provides the statistically significant alpha intercept at the 1 % level and 
1,069 % monthly excess return. The FF3 model shows that the WML alpha intercept was 
statistically significant at the 1 % level in the whole sample period, but the robustness 
test results show that alpha intercepts are not statistically significant in every subsample 
period. The alpha intercepts of the WML* are statistically significant at the 5 % and 1 % 
levels in every subsample period expect in the third period where the alpha intercept is 
insignificant. Once again, the whole sample alpha intercept is statistically significant at 
the 1 % level, but it is not statistically significant in every subsample period for the WML* 
strategy.  The highest significant monthly abnormal return for the WML* is 2,086 %, and 
the lowest significant monthly abnormal return is 1,304 %. All in all, WML and WML* do 
not produce significant monthly abnormal returns in every subsample period, however, 
WML* produces higher monthly abnormal returns in every subsample period than the 
WML. 
 
The FF3 model independent variables explain the returns of WML and WML* strategies 
in table 6. In the first period, RMRF has a coefficient that is statistically significant at the 
10 % level for the WML, and the RMRF factor has a negative loading of 0-549. For the 
WML* there are not significant coefficients that can explain the WML* returns in the 
first period. In the second period, HML has statistically significant coefficient at the 1 % 
level for the WML, and the HML factor has a negative loading of -1,293. The same factor 
is statistically significant at the 1 % level for the WML* and it has a negative factor loading 
of -0,959. These factors have high loadings compared to their alpha intercepts. This find-
ing suggests that growth stocks can explain some of the WML and WML* returns in the 
second period. In the third period, there are two statistically significant coefficients at 
the 5 % and 1 % levels for the WML. These are RMRF and HML. The RMRF has a negative 
factor loading of -0,301 and p-value of 0,024, whereas the HML factor has a negative 
loading of -0,620 and p-value of 0,004. The same coefficients are statistically significant 
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at the 10 % and 1 % levels for the WML*. The RMRF factor has a negative loading of -
0,222 and p-value of 0,097, whereas the HML factor has a negative loading of -0,617 and 
p-value of 0,006. The RMRF factor suggests that WML and WML* returns move partially 
to the opposite direction than RMRF returns. The HML loadings are high again compared 
to alpha intercepts. In the no crash period RMRF has a statistically significant coefficient 
at the 5 % level for WML and the RMRF factor has a negative loading of -0,318. The HML 
has statistically significant coefficient at the 10 % level for WML* and the HML factor has 
a negative loading -0,481. It is important to notice that FF3 model’s independent varia-
ble’s coefficients do not significantly explain WML and WML* returns in every subsample 
period. Even though, FF3 model in the whole sample suggests that RMRF factor explains 
WML returns at the statistically significant level at 1 % and HML factor explains WML* 
returns at the statistically significant level at 5 % in the whole sample. Another important 
notice is that FF3 model explains better the WML returns than the WML* returns, how-
ever, the FF3 model’s total explanation power of the WML returns is not high.  
 
Table 7 presents the FF5 regression’s robustness test for the WML and WML*. The first 
finding is that the alpha intercepts to WML are not statistically significant in any subsam-
ple period. The robustness test results for the alpha intercepts of the WML are in line 
with the whole sample FF5 results. The alpha intercepts of the WML* are statistically 
significant in the second period and the no crash period but not in the first and the third 
period. In the second period, the alpha intercept is statistically significant at the at 5 % 
level and in the no crash period it is statistically significant at the 1 % level. A significant 
monthly abnormal return is 1,28 % in the second period and 1,178 % in the no crash 
period. The robustness test shows that the WML* alpha intercept is not statistically sig-
nificant in every subsample period even though it is statistically significant in the whole 
sample period (table 4). 
 
The FF5 model’s independent variables explain the returns of WML and WML* strategies 
in table 7. In the first period, three coefficients are statistically significant at the 10 %, 5 % 
and 1 % levels for the WML. The RMRF factor has a negative loading of -0,440 and p-
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value of 0,028, the RMW factor has a positive loading of 1,922 and p-value of 0,001 and 
finally CMA factor has a negative loading of -1,127 and p-value of 0,069. Negative and 
significant RMRF factor means that WML returns moves to the opposite direction than 
RMRF returns. The positive and significant RMW factor implies that WML returns can be 
explained by profitable companies’ returns. The negative and significant CMA factor im-
plies that companies that are investing aggressively can explain the WML returns. In the 
first period, RMW has a statistically significant coefficient for the WML*. The RWM factor 
has a positive loading of 1,124 and p-value of 0,009. In the second period, there are 
statistically significant coefficients at the 5 % and 10 % levels for the WML portfolio. HML 
factor has a negative loading of -1,600 and p-value of 0,034, whereas CMA factor has a 
positive loading of 1,180 and p-value of 0,074. Also, the HML factor is statistically signif-
icant for the WML* in the second period. It has a negative loading of -0,112 and p-value 
of 0,011. The HML factor is also economically significant compared to WML* alpha in-
tercept.  
 
Table 7. Table summarizes the Fama-French 5-factor model (FF5) regression results in different 
subsamples. The first period covers 1995:01-2003:04, the second period covers 2003:05-2011:08, 
the third period covers 2011:09-2019:12 and the no crash period covers 1995:01-2019:12 where 
the financial crisis in 2009 is excluded. Alpha is the intercept of the regression and the factor 
loadings are RMRF (market return minus risk-free rate), SMB (small minus big), HML (high minus 
low), RMW (robust minus weak) and CMA (conservative minus aggressive). WML is the plain 
momentum and WML* is the risk-managed momentum. All regressions are Newey-West (1987) 
corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.  Statistically significant: 1) *** on a 1 % 








The third period shows that only the HML factor is statistically significant at the 5 % level 
for the WML in table 7. It has a negative loading of -1,007 and p-value of 0,015. The same 
factor is also statistically significant at the 5 % level for the WML* and it has a negative 
loading of -1,526. In the no crash period RMRF and RMW have statistically significant 
coefficients at the 5 % and 1 % levels for WML. The RMRF factor has a negative loading 
of -0,242 and p-value of 0,024. The RMW factor has a positive loading of 1,288 and p-
value of 0,003. The coefficient of the RMW is statistically significant at the 5 % level for 
the WML* and the positive loading of the RMW factor is 0,650. FF5 model’s factors RMRF 
and RMW explain the WML returns significantly in the whole sample, and also RMW 
factor explains the WML* returns significantly in the whole sample. However, the ro-
bustness test shows that FF5 model’s factors do not explain WML and WML* returns 
significantly in every subsample period. Furthermore, FF5 does a better job at explaining 
the WML returns than WML* returns, and the FF5 model explains better the WML and 
WML* returns than FF3 model.  
 
Now the large stocks’ plain momentum and risk-managed momentum results in Europe 
have been examined. It is time to investigate the risk-managed momentum globally. First, 
the descriptive statistics for the plain momentum and risk-managed momentum in North 
America, Japan and Asia-Pacific will be presented. Then the worldwide risk-managed 
momentum returns will be investigated by FF3 and FF5 regression models, and finally, 
the robustness tests will be presented. 
 
Table 8 presents a whole sample period descriptive statistic for the plain momentum and 
risk-managed momentum in North America, Japan and Asia-Pacific. The MWL* has a 
lower single month maximum return in all research regions than WML has.  The biggest 
difference between single month maximum return is in North America, where the differ-
ence is 18,79 %. The WML suffers a worse single month minimum return in every re-
search region compared to MWL*. The biggest difference between single month mini-
mum return is in Asia-Pacific, where the different is 35,13 %. The results are in line with 
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the Barroso and Santa Clara’s (2015) findings in the U.S., France, Germany and Japan. 
However, in this paper, the maximum month return findings globally are different than 
in Europe. This might be a result of many variables, as discussed earlier.  
 
 
Table 8. Descriptive statistics for the plain momentum (WML) and the risk-managed momentum 
(WML*). The mean average excess return, the standard deviation and the Sharpe ratio are an-
nualized, and others are given in monthly figures. The time period is from 1995:01 to 2019:12. 
 
The annualized mean excess return is higher for WML* than WML in every research re-
gion in table 8. The best benefit of managing the risk of momentum is reached in Asia-
Pacific.  The annualized mean excess returns increase from -0,60 % to 8,92 %. This is clear 
evidence that the risk-managed momentum is more profitable than the plain momen-
tum in terms of the mean return. The annualized standard deviation is lower for the 
WML* than WML in every research region. In North America the WML* strategy pro-
vides 5,56 % lower annualized standard deviation and in Japan WML* strategy provides 
2,42 % lower annualized standard deviation. In Asia-Pacific, the annualized standard de-
viation decreases 0,34 % when WML* is used. Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) get glob-
ally similar findings.  
 
Managing the risk of momentum improves kurtosis and skewness in every research re-
gion in table 8. In Japan, the WML* only decreases the kurtosis from 4,76 to 4,04, but in 
Asia-Pacific, the kurtosis decreases from 16,93 to 4,20. The lowest kurtosis is in North 
America after managing the risk of momentum. Risk-managed momentum increases 
skewness in every research period, and skewness gets only positive values. Once again, 
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these results imply that the risk-managed momentum virtually eliminates the crash risk, 
as discussed earlier. Furthermore, after managing the risk of momentum, the Sharpe 
ratio increases in North-America from 0,26 to 0,42, in Japan from 0,08 to 0,25 and in 
Asia-Pacific from -0,02 to 0,36. Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) also find that risk-man-
aged momentum improves the Sharpe ratio globally. Thus, it can be said that risk-man-
aged momentum is globally more profitable strategy than the plain momentum strategy.   
 
Table 9 presents the results that answer to the hypothesis 3. Panel A shows the FF3 re-
gression results and panel B shows the FF5 regression results. In North America, the FF3 
regression’s alpha intercept for WML* is statistically significant at the 1 % level and pro-
duces a significant abnormal monthly return of 0,782% but the FF5 regression’s alpha 
intercept for WML* is not statistically significant at the 5 % level. In Japan, both FF3 and 
FF5 regressions’ alpha intercepts for WML* are insignificant. Thus, the hypothesis 3 is 
rejected for North America and Japan. In Asia-Pacific, the FF3 and FF5 regressions show 
that the alpha intercepts for the WML* are statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels. 
The FF3 regression shows that the WML* produces a significant monthly abnormal re-
turn of 1,136%, and the FF5 regression shows that the WML* offers a significant monthly 
abnormal return of 0,858 %. Thus, the hypothesis 3 is accepted for the Asia-Pacific. Now 
to the last main research question has been answered. All in all, risk-managed momen-
tum produces statistically significant positive abnormal returns only in the Asia-Pacific 





Table 9. Panel A presents the Fama-French 3-factor model (FF3) regression results and Panel B 
presents the Fama-French 5-factor model (FF5) regression results. Time period is from 1995:01 
to 2019:12 in both regressions. Alpha is the intercept of the regression, and the factor loadings 
are RMRF (market return minus risk-free rate), SMB (small minus big), HML (high minus low), 
RMW (robust minus weak) and CMA (conservative minus aggressive). WML* is the risk-managed 
momentum. All regressions are Newey-West (1987) corrected for autocorrelation and hetero-
scedasticity. Statistically significant: 1) *** on a 1 % level, 2) ** on a 5 % level, 3) * on a 10 % 
level. 
 
In table 9, the FF3 model’s independent variables explain the returns of the WML* strat-
egy. In North America, two coefficients are statistically significant at the 10 % and 5 % 
levels for the WML*. The RMRF factor has a negative loading of -0,156, and the HML 
factor has a negative loading of -0,374. The negative HML factor implies that WML* re-
turns can be explained by growth firms. In Japan, the same factors are statistically signif-
icant at the 10 % and 5 % levels than in North America. The RMRF factor has a negative 
loading of -0,192, and the HML factor has a negative loading -0,461. In Asia-Pacific, two 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 10 % and 5 % levels for the WML*. The SMB 
factor has a positive loading of 0,261 and p-value of 0,063. The HML factor has a negative 
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loading of -0,432 and p-value of 0,011. It is interesting to notice that growth firms explain 
WML* returns in every research region when WML* returns are measured by FF3 model.   
 
The FF5 model’s independent variables explain the returns of the WML* strategy in table 
9. In North America, two coefficients are statistically significant at the 5 % and 1 % levels 
for the WML*. The HML factor remains statistically significant with a negative loading of 
-0,545. The RMW factor has a positive loading of 0,528. This means that firms that are 
operating profitably can partially explain the WML* returns. In Japan, there is only one 
coefficient that is statistically significant at the 1 % level for the WML*. The RMW has a 
positive loading of 0,960. In Asia-Pacific, three coefficients are statistically significant at 
the 5 % and 1 % levels for the WML*. The SMB factor has a positive loading of 0,370 and 
p-value of 0,007. This denotes that large firms’ risk-managed momentum return move 
to the same direction than small firms’ return. This might be a result of that the large 
firms’ winner stocks move to the same direction than the small firms’ stocks and the 
large firms’ loser stocks move to the opposite direction than the small firms’ stocks. At 
the same time, large firms’ risk-managed momentum strategy has a long position on 
winner stocks and short position on loser stocks.  The HML factor remains statistically 
significant with a negative loading of -0,536, and the CMA factor has a positive loading 
of 0,571. The positive CMA factor implies that firms with conservative investments ex-
plain the MWL* returns. The FF5 model factors HML and CMA are economically signifi-
cant compared to WML* alpha intercept in Asia-Pacific. Furthermore, the FF5 model 
does a better job at explaining the WML* returns in every research region than the FF3 
model, however, the explanatory power is quite low.   
 
The robustness test for the plain momentum and the risk-managed momentum in North 
America, Japan and Asia-Pacific is presented in table 10. The same subsample periods 
are used than in the European’s robustness test. Panel A presents the robustness test for 
North America, panel B presents the robustness test for Japan and panel C presents the 




Panel A in table 10 shows that in North America the WML has a higher month maximum 
return than the WML* in every subsample period except in the third period. Whereas, 
the monthly minimum return is better for the WML* than the WML in every subsample 
period except in the third period.  The annualized mean excess return is higher for the 
WML* in the second and third period but lower in the first and no crash period. This 
means that the whole sample annualized mean excess return result is not robust, and 
annualized mean excess returns vary in different time periods. The annualized standard 
deviation is lower for the WML* in every subsample period except in the third period. 
This also means that the time periods affect to annualized standard deviation results. 
The different outcome in the third period compared to other periods may depend on 
that fact that the third period in the stock market is quite calm and bullish compared to 
other periods. Kurtosis in panel A is lower for the WML* than the WML, however, in the 
third period, the kurtosis is lower for the WML. The WML*’s skewness is positive in every 
subsample period, and it is also better in every subsample period except in the third 
period. The Sharpe ratio improves in every subsample period when managing the risk of 
momentum. The Sharpe ratio results are in the with the whole sample results and Bar-
roso and Santa Clara’s (2015) findings.  
 
Panel B in table 10 shows that in Japan, the maximum month return is higher for WML 
in the first and no crash periods. To the WML* the maximum month return is higher for 
in the second and the third period. The minimum month return is better for the WML* 
in every subsample period and this result is consistent with the Japan’s whole sample 
minimum month result. The annualized mean excess return is higher for the WML* in 
every subsample period except in the first period. In the first period, the annualized 
mean excess return is only 1,59 % higher for the WML. The WML* reduces the annual-
ized standard deviation in every time period expect in the third period. The kurtoses are 
almost identical between WML and WML*. The WML’s kurtosis is lower in the first period 
but higher in the other periods. The WML* has only positive skewness values, and it 
improves the skewness values in every subsample period. The Sharpe ratio is higher for 
the WML* in every subsample period. The skewness and the Sharpe ratio results are in 
59 
 
line with Japan’s whole sample results and mostly in line with Barroso and Santa Clara’s 
(2015) findings in Japan.   
 
Panel C in table 10 shows that in Asia-Pacific the maximum month return is higher for 
the WML in the first period and no crash period whereas, the maximum month return is 
higher in the second and the third period for the WML*. The minimum month return is 
better for the WML* in every subsample period except in the third period. In the first 
period, the WML suffers from a minimum month return of -55,33 % and WML*’s mini-
mum month return is -22,20 % in the first period. The annualized mean excess return is 
higher for the WML* in every subsample period, thus annualized mean excess return is 
consistent with the whole sample result. The annualized standard deviation is higher for 
the WML in the first and the no crash period whereas, the WML* has a higher annualized 
standard deviation in the second and the third period. The WML* has lower kurtosis in 
the first and the no crash period, but the WML has lower kurtosis in the second and the 
third period. The WML* has better skewness and the Sharpe ratio in every subsample 
period. Thus, the skewness and the Sharpe ratio results are consistent with the whole 





Table 10. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the plain momentum (WML) and the risk-
managed momentum (WML*) in North America. Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the 
plain momentum (WML) and the risk-managed momentum (WML*) in Japan. Panel C presents 
descriptive statistics for the plain momentum (WML) and the risk-managed momentum (WML*) 
in Asia-Pacific. Time period is divided into four different subsamples. The first period covers 
1995:01-2003:04, the second period covers 2003:05-2011:08, the third period covers 2011:09-
2019:12 and no crash period covers 1995:01-2019:12 where the financial crisis in 2009 is ex-
cluded. The mean average excess return, the standard deviation and the Sharpe ratio are annu-
alized, and others are given in monthly figures. 
 
The most interesting findings in table 10 are presented next. Most of the time the annu-
alized mean excess returns are globally better for the risk-managed momentum than the 
plain momentum. Sometimes the plain momentum produces negative annualized mean 
excess returns, whereas, the risk-managed momentum produces only positive annual-
ized mean excess returns. Globally the risk-managed momentum reduces the high kur-
tosis values. In Japan, the kurtosis values are almost identical in different subsample 
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periods. The risk-managed momentum improves the skewness globally in every subsam-
ple period except in the no crash period in North America. The skewness for the risk-
managed momentum is negative in the first period in the Asia-Pacific, but otherwise 
globally it is positive for the risk-managed momentum.  The Sharpe ratio is globally 
higher for the risk-managed momentum than plain momentum in every subsample pe-
riod. This is a robust result that risk-managed momentum produces a higher return for 
every taken unit of risk. 
 
Next, the robustness tests are formed to FF3 and FF5 regressions and the same subsam-
ple periods are used than in the descriptive statistic’s robustness test. Panel A presents 
the robustness test for North America, panel B presents the robustness test for Japan 
and panel C presents the robustness test for Asia-Pacific.  Table 11 shows the FF3 regres-
sion’s robustness results for the WML* and table 12 presents the FF5 regression’s ro-
bustness results for the WML*. 
 
Table 11 shows the FF3 regression’s alpha intercepts for the WML*. In the first and no 
crash periods, the alpha intercepts are statistically significant at the 5 % and 10 % levels 
for North America in panel A. The monthly abnormal return is 1,132 % in the first period 
and in the no crash period the monthly abnormal return is 0,808 %. Panel B shows that 
Japan has only one statistically significant alpha intercept at the 10 % level in the no crash 
period. Panel C shows that the Asia-Pacific has two statistically significant alpha inter-
cepts at the 1 % level. In the first period the WML* produces a monthly abnormal return 
of 1,891 % and in the no crash period the WML* produces a monthly abnormal return 
of 1,310 %. The alpha intercept of the whole sample is statistically significant at the 1 % 
level in North America and Asia-Pacific, but in the robustness test, the results are not 




Table 11. Panel A presents the Fama-French 3-factor model (FF3) regression results in North 
America. Panel B presents the Fama-French 3-factor model (FF3) regression results in Japan. 
Panel C presents the Fama-French 3-factor model (FF3) regression results in Asia-Pacific. Time 
period is divided into four different subsamples. The first period covers 1995:01-2003:04, the 
second period covers 2003:05-2011:08, the third period covers 2011:09-2019:12 and the no 
crash period covers 1995:01-2019:12. Alpha is the intercept of the regression, and the factor 
loadings are RMRF (market return minus risk-free rate), SMB (small minus big) and HML (high 
minus low). WML* is the risk-managed momentum. All regressions are Newey-West (1987) cor-
rected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.  Statistically significant: 1) *** on a 1 % level, 
2) ** on a 5 % level, 3) * on a 10 % level. 
 
In table 11, the FF3 model independent variables explain the returns of WML* strategy. 
FF3 model in the whole sample shows that North America has two significant coefficients 
at 10 % and 5 % levels for the WML*. In panel A the robustness check shows that none 
of the independent variable coefficients is statistically significant in every subsample pe-
riod. The closest is the HML factor, which is statistically significant in the second, third 
and no crash period. Furthermore, the lowest adjusted r squared 0,008 is in the first 
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period, and the highest adjusted r squared 0,348 is in the third period. All in all, in North 
America the FF3 model does not do a good job at explaining the WML* returns. 
 
FF3 model in the whole sample shows that Japan has two significant coefficients at 10 % 
and 5 % levels for the WML*. In table 11 the panel B shows that in Japan, none of the 
independent variable coefficients is statistically significant in every subsample period. In 
the whole sample, the SMB factor is not statistically significant, but in the subsamples, 
the SMB factor is statistically significant in the first and third period. In the first period, 
the SMB factor has a negative loading of -0,459, and in the third period, it has a positive 
loading of 0,439. Thus, it can be said that sometimes large firms and sometimes small 
firms explain the WML* returns. Moreover, in Japan, the FF3 model does not do a good 
job of explaining the WML* returns. 
 
In the whole sample, the FF3 model shows that in Asia-Pacific, two coefficients are sta-
tistically significant at 10 % and 5 % levels for the WML*. The robustness check in table 
11 shows that none of the independent variable coefficients is statistically significant in 
every subsample period in Asia-Pacific. The closest is the HML factor, which is statistically 
significant in the first, second and no crash period. In the third period, there are not 
statistically significant factors but is not a surprise because the adjusted r squared is 
slightly negative. The negative adjusted r squared means that the FF3 model is useless 
in the third period. All in all, the FF3 model does not do a good job at explaining the 
WML* returns in Asia-Pacific. 
 
The FF5 model’s alpha intercepts for the WML* are presented in table 12. Panel A shows 
that North America has a statistically significant coefficient at the 10 % level only in the 
no crash period. In the no crash period, the monthly abnormal return is 0,588 % for the 
WML*. Panel B shows that there are not statistically significant alpha intercepts in Japan. 
Panel C shows that the Asia-Pacific has two statistically significant alpha intercepts at the 
5 % level. In the first period WML* produces a monthly abnormal return of 1,372 % and 
in the no crash period WML* produces a monthly excess return of 1,024 %.  The alpha 
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intercept of the whole sample is statistically significant at the 10 % level in North America 
and statistically significant at the 5 % level in Asia-Pacific, but in the robustness test, the 
alpha intercepts are not statistically significant in every subsample period. 
 
In table 12, the FF5 model shows that North America has two significant coefficients in 
the whole sample period at the 1 % level for the WML*. The robustness check in panel 
A shows that none of the independent variable coefficients is statistically significant in 
every subsample period. The closest is the RMW factor, which is statistically significant 
in the second, third and no crash period at the 10 % and 1 % levels. The HML factor is 
statistically significant in the third and no crash period at the 1 % level. Moreover, the 
adjusted r squared is negative in the first period, which means that the FF5 model is 
useless. In all other periods, the adjusted r squared is positive, even though the FF5 
model does not have high explanatory power. 
 
In the whole sample, the FF5 model shows that in Japan, the RMW coefficient is statisti-
cally significant at the 1 % level for the WML*. In table 12, the robustness check shows 
that the RWM coefficient is only statistically significant in the third and no crash period. 
Furthermore, the adjusted r squared vary from 0,014 to 0,268. This means that FF5 
model does not have good explanatory power. 
 
FF5 model results in the whole sample show that in the Asia-Pacific, there are three sta-
tistically significant coefficients at the 5 % and 1 % levels for the WML*. The robustness 
check in panel C shows that none of the independent variable coefficients is statistically 
significant in every subsample period. The closest is the HML factor, which is statistically 
significant in the first, second and no crash period. Moreover, the FF5 model does not 
explain the WML* returns well and in the third period adjusted r squared is slightly neg-





Table 12.  Panel A presents the Fama-French 5-factor model (FF5) regression results in North 
America. Panel B presents the Fama-French 5-factor model (FF5) regression results in Japan. 
Panel C presents the Fama-French 5-factor model (FF5) regression results in Asia-Pacific. Time 
period is divided into four different subsamples. The first period covers 1995:01-2003:04, the 
second period covers 2003:05-2011:08, the third period covers 2011:09-2019:12 and the no 
crash period covers 1995:01-2019:12. Alpha is the intercept of the regression, and the factor 
loadings are RMRF (market return minus risk-free rate), SMB (small minus big), HML (high minus 
low), RMW (robust minus weak) and CMA (conservative minus aggressive). WML* is the risk-
managed momentum. All regressions are Newey-West (1987) corrected for autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity.  Statistically significant: 1) *** on a 1 % level, 2) ** on a 5 % level, 3) * on a 
10 % level. 
 
All in all, the whole sample FF3 and FF5 regressions’ alpha intercepts are statistically 
significant for the WML* in North America and Asia-Pacific. However, the robustness 
checks show that the alpha intercepts are not statistically significant in every subsample 
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period. The robustness checks also prove that the independent variables’ coefficients 
are not statistically significant in every subsample period. Furthermore, the FF3 and FF5 
models do not explain well the abnormal returns of the WML*. Most of the times the 



















The plain momentum strategy is prone to momentum crashes, and the crashes could 
wipe out the decade of the momentum returns (Barroso and Santa-Clara 2015; Daniel 
and Moskowitz 2016). Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) show that managing the risk of 
the momentum by its realized variance of daily returns can mitigate the crash risk and 
improve profitability. Therefore, this thesis examines abnormal returns of the risk-man-
aged momentum first in Europe and subsequently globally in North America, Japan and 
Asia-Pacific by using the Fama-French 3- and 5-factor OLS regressions. Moreover, this 
thesis investigates how much risk-managed momentum improves the Sharpe ratio and 
negative elements of the plain momentum in the whole sample period and subsample 
periods. 
 
In this paper, the most important findings are found in the regression results. The risk-
managed momentum generates statistically significant positive abnormal returns at 
least at 5 % level in Europe and Asia-Pacific but not in North America and Japan. Thus, 
these results give answers to the main research questions, as discussed earlier. Even 
though the risk-managed momentum strategy is not able to generate statistically signif-
icant positive abnormal returns in every research area, it provides many benefits for in-
vestors when the risk-managed momentum is compared to plain momentum. The re-
sults in this paper show that managing the risk of the momentum strategy improve the 
skewness greatly and even provide positive skewness values in Europe and globally. 
These skewness results are mostly in line with Barroso and Santa-Clara’s (2015) findings. 
Also, in this paper, it is observed that the risk-managed momentum improves kurtosis of 
the momentum and provides near the normal distribution kurtosis values in every re-
search area. The Sharpe ratio is improved in Europe and globally when the risk of the 
momentum is managed. These results are robust in every subsample period and also in 
line with Barroso and Santa-Clara’s (2015) and Grobys, Ruotsalainen and Äijö’s (2018) 
results. The biggest improvement of the Sharpe ratio is in the Asia-Pacific where the plain 
momentum first provides a negative Sharpe ratio value of -0,02, and the risk-managed 
momentum increases the Sharpe ratio to 0,36. Furthermore, in the most turbulence 
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times, the risk-managed momentum improves the plain momentum performance and 
mitigates the momentum crash risk. 
 
Overall, this paper shows that risk-managed momentum solves the main problems re-
lated to the plain momentum in Europe and globally. Therefore, it is more safety and 
profitable strategy for investors. In the field of risk-managed momentum, there are many 
topics where future research could be related to. The risk-managed momentum has 
been now investigated globally in the equity markets, and therefore, it could be interest-
ing to investigate risk-managed industrial momentum globally. Studying the risk-man-
aged momentum in different asset classes such as fixed-income securities and currencies 
could be interesting. Furthermore, it could be interesting to investigate the risk-managed 
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